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High-speed or “broadband” Internet access currently is provided, at the local 
level, chiefly by cable television and telephone companies, often in competition with 
each other. Wireless and satellite providers have a small but growing share of this 
business. An influential coalition of economic interests and academics have proposed that 
local broadband Internet access providers be prohibited from restricting access to their 
systems by upstream suppliers of Internet services. A recent term for this proposal is “net 
neutrality.” 
 
We examine the potential costs and benefits of such a policy from an economic 
welfare perspective. Using a property rights approach, we ask whether transactions costs 
in the market for access rights are likely to be significant, and if so, whether owners of 
physical local broadband platforms are likely to be more or less efficient holders of 
access rights than Internet content providers. We conclude that transactions costs are 
likely to be lower if access rights are assigned initially to platform owners rather than 
content providers. In addition, platform hardware owners are likely to be more efficient 
holders of these rights because they can internalize demand-side interactions among 
content products. Further, failure to permit platform owners to control access threatens to 
result in inadequate incentives to invest in, to maintain, and to upgrade local broadband 
platforms.  
 
Inefficiently denying platform owners the ability to own access rights implies a 
need for price regulation; otherwise, there will be incentives to use pricing to circumvent 
the constraint on rights ownership. Price regulation is itself known to induce welfare 
losses through adaptive behavior of the constrained firm. The impact on welfare might 
produce a worse result than the initial problem, assuming one existed. 
 
Much of the academic interest in net neutrality arises from the belief that the open 
architecture of the Internet under current standards has been responsible for its 
remarkable success, and a wish to preserve this openness. We point out that the openness 
of the Internet was an unintended consequence of its military origins, and that other, less 
open, architectures might have been even more successful. A policy of denying platform 
owners the ability to own access rights could freeze the architecture of the Internet, 
preventing it from adapting to future technological and economic developments. 
 
Finally, we examine the net neutrality issue from the perspective of the “essential 
facility doctrine,” a tool of the common law of antitrust. The doctrine establishes 
conditions under which federal courts will mandate access by competitors to the 
monopoly platform of a vertically-integrated firm. Because local broadband Internet 
access is not today a bottleneck monopoly (there are several competitors and the market 
is at an early stage of development), the essential facilities doctrine would not permit 
reassignment of access rights from platform owners to competitors. We conclude that 
“net neutrality” is a welfare-reducing policy proposal.     






Great constitutional principles seem to be at stake in the clash over access to 
broadband facilities, or “net neutrality” to use the current rather ambiguous term for 
proposed federal regulation of the Internet. These proposals bring the First Amendment 
to war with the Fifth. According to Professor Larry Lessig, for example, sound public 
policy consists of a preemptive regulatory intervention designed to preserve the Internet’s 
original libertarian values in the pursuit of competition and innovation. On the other side, 
owners of Internet hardware, threatened with expropriation, defend vigorously their right 
to exclude others from free riding on their investments and make their own arguments 
about the pursuit of competition and innovation. 
A conflict of more modest principles arises from what might be characterized as 
the war of default policies. Primum non nocere (first, do no harm), is a medical precept 
often, but inaccurately, attributed to the Greek physician Hippocrates. It gathers modern 
support from the observation that patients with some disorders (e.g., acute back pain) 
recover at about the same rate with or without treatment, while those treated are 
sometimes injured by the treatment. The opposite principle, primum processi (act first)
2 
evokes the picture of the Dutch boy with his finger plugging the small hole in the dike 
that protects Holland from the sea. These two default policies do not fit neatly into a 
standard liberal/conservative dichotomy. The first counsels nonintervention to permit 
change to occur through decentralized market mechanisms. The second counsels 
centralized preemptive regulation to preserve the benefits of existing decentralized 
market structures. 
                                                 
1   Acronyms used in the text:  
CLEC—Competitive local exchange carrier;  
DSL—Digital subscriber line;  
FCC—Federal Communications Commission (Commission);  
ILEC–Incumbent local exchange carrier (telephone company);  
ISP—Internet service provider;  
LBB—Local broadband distribution system, whether wired or wireless;  
MMDS/LMDS—Multipoint (or local) 2.4-2.7 gigahertz (“local” is above 20 gigahertz) wireless 
distribution system, also know as multi-channel (“local”) multi-point distribution system 
or as “wireless cable”—terrestrial medium-range (up to 35 mile) broadband services. 
WIFI—Terrestrial short-range (30 meter) wireless broadband Internet service (“wireless fidelity”) 
using IEEE standard 802.11. 
2   This phrase is adopted from the title of a paper by Bar, et al. (1999), responding to former FCC 





3 is at odds with what we will call the Lessig School of 
thought on access to broadband facilities.
4 Specifically, in this policy debate we think that 
access regulations will likely have greater costs (through their adverse impact on property 
rights and economic incentives) than benefits (through their preservation of the Internet 
libertarian culture and incentives). Nevertheless, we have every sympathy with the Lessig 
School. One of us (Owen) once advocated, in analogous circumstances, common carrier 
status for cable television systems as a means to avoid government regulation of video 
content. As it turned out, that proposal would have been bad policy for two reasons, both 
applicable to the current discussion.  
First, rather than being harmful to consumers, vertical integration into 
programming was a key ingredient in the economic success of cable television in the 
1980s. Independent programmers did not come forward in sufficient numbers to support 
cable infrastructure demand in urban areas; it was necessary for cable operators to invest 
in cable networks. Second, Owen’s proposal coincided with the peak—i.e., the beginning 
of the end—of a consensus favoring federal regulation of television content. The threat to 
First Amendment values turned out to be less than it appeared. In short, the benefits of 
the proposal would have been small or zero and the costs for consumers would have been 
large. Nevertheless, given the ratchet character of regulatory intervention, it would have 
been very difficult to repeal a mistaken common carrier policy. We think the Lessig 
School proposals regarding restrictions on vertical integration for high-speed access 
providers pose similar risks for related reasons. 
                                                 
3   We have previously written papers on behalf of the National Cable Telecommunications 
Association examining investment incentives from forced access to high-speed cable Internet 
providers. Owen (2002), Owen and Rosston (1998). However, the current “net neutrality” 
proposal would apply to both cable and telephone (DSL) services, and presumably also to 
wireless, satellite, power line, WIFI, M/L/MDS and other broadband distribution methods. (The 
various technologies are described on the FCC’s web site 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/highspeedinternet.html.)  This paper looks not only at the investment 
incentives, but also to the overall character of the marketplace for Internet services and content. 
Effects on investment incentives remain relevant because present systems need continued 
upgrades as technology changes. 
4   Lessig (2001b). More recent summaries linked to the concept of net neutrality appear in Lessig 




The Lessig camp seeks to promote or at least to preserve the values that made the 
Internet what it is today.
5 What are they? We think a fair reading of the filings, articles 
and white papers of this school is as follows: 
 
Maximize individual freedom of speech and opportunities for innovation: 
   Anyone should be free to offer content on the Internet. 
   No one, aside from the originator of the content, should be in a position to 
impede any user’s access to any content, either directly or indirectly, 
through technical standards, access or pricing decisions. 
 
From these principles, it follows that: 
   Local broadband access facilities should be common carriers—i.e., should 
be required to transmit all content on nondiscriminatory terms. 
 
We use the term “content” in this paper as an icon for services such as searching 
and transacting as well as information and entertainment. Many adherents of the Lessig 
school would extend the principle to apply to hardware and other technical innovations 
through the use of open, non-proprietary standards. The access camp focuses on local 
broadband (LBB) facilities such as DSL and cable modem services, which it sees as 
potential bottlenecks, threatening the objectives above. For these advocates, the first step 
of “net neutrality” is to exclude no one from access to the local and long distance portions 
of the Internet. But, according to Lessig, the neutrality principles should extend to any 
aspect of the Internet that threatens basic values of what Lessig calls “the commons” by 
marrying control of transmission with control of content. This implies not merely that 
rights of access be transferred from suppliers to users, but that the technology and 
architecture of the Internet be preserved in its current form, as that form affects access. 
On the other side of the debate, analysts point out that net neutrality may not be 
welfare enhancing, may indeed create incentive effects that reduce consumer welfare, and 
                                                 
5   “The myriad benefits of the Internet Age flow from one fundamental feature – the ability of 
consumers and businesses to communicate with one another and lawfully to create, share and 
access information, all without obstruction from network service providers.” Coalition of 
Broadband Users and Innovators (2002). Although we do not pursue it here, we think this claim is 




may simply be unnecessary due to the presence of competition or the absence of any 
incentive to exclude.
6  
This paper will examine the logic and evidence behind the cases made by each 
side and finally explain the reasoning that leads us to reject the Lessig school proposals. 
We use a property rights approach because Lessig himself characterizes the issue in 
property rights terms and, ultimately, this is a debate about how much control private 
companies can exercise over the use of the facilities and protocols they develop.  
Lessig promotes an Internet commons in which certain private property rights are 
forbidden to hardware owners. While not usually analyzed in these terms, price 
regulation and antitrust enforcement also restrict private property rights to further the 
public interest. In addition, in examining property rights, we look at the incentives for 
innovation and the incentive and ability to act anticompetitively by excluding more 
efficient suppliers from providing services to consumers using proprietary resources. 
 
Property Rights 
Property consists of bundles of rights established by law and protected by the 
state. The definition does not appeal to any underlying principles of justice. When we buy 
or create property we understand what rights are attached to the physical (or intellectual) 
manifestation of the property. This understanding informs our decision (incentive) to 
purchase, preserve or create property.  
In the United States under current constitutional law the state is obliged to provide 
compensation when it takes one or more of these rights for its own or public use, 
provided that the taking is physical or, if regulatory, destroys the entire economic value 
of the bundle of rights.
7 Also, the state is obliged to observe defined forms of due process 
(but not to compensate) when it takes one or more of these rights for regulatory purposes 
(e.g., to control “nuisances” or externalities such as noise pollution, or to ensure that 
prices or profits are not excessive). Finally, the state is obliged to defend property rights 
                                                 
6   See, for example, Speta (2000), Woroch (2002) and Wu (forthcoming 2003). 
7   Spulber and Yoo (2003) provide an extensive summary of the takings law and literature and 
address specifically the problem of local broadband access. Recent cases on regulatory takings 
include Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 




against private trespass or appropriation. The founding generation, children of the 
Enlightenment, viewed property rights as based in natural law and as one dimension of a 
Lockean social contract. Today it is more usual to take a utilitarian perspective. For most 
economists this means that private property rights should be defined (and defended) so as 
to optimize some agreed aggregation of individually-perceived well-being, a.k.a. 
economic welfare. 
The link between property rights and economic welfare, for present purposes, 
consists of incentive effects. First, the process of preserving, enhancing or creating 
property can make both the investor and other members of society better off. Those who 
are better off include, for example, persons employed in the process, and those who value 
the property or its use more highly than the resources used up in its preservation or 
creation. Economic actors are induced to invest in the preservation, enhancement or 
creation of property by the prospect of gain.
8 The details of this process and of the rights 
matter, and are subject to public policy analysis to determine their welfare effects.  
A property rights perspective is useful because there is a large body of economic 
analysis regarding the efficiency and incentive effects of different property rights 
regimes.
 9  Probably the most famous manifestation of this literature is the Coase 
Theorem, which stands for two principles: (1) that in the absence of transactions costs, 
alienable property rights will end up being put to their most efficient use, so that it does 
not matter to whom they are initially assigned, and (2) that in the presence of transactions 
costs it may be quite important to assign property rights initially to, or near to, their most 
efficient users. It is of course the second principle that is most relevant to public policy 
analysis in the real world, where transactions often are very costly. 
Others counter that in some cases, especially where transactions costs are 
significant, where there is an incentive to exclude users to increase price, or an inability 
to meter usage, property rights solutions can lead to inefficient exclusion or withholding 
of capacity from the market. Lessig (2001) also makes this argument in advocating a 
                                                 
8   This approach is quite general. It can be used, for example, to approach the issue of human capital 
formation as a function of civil liberties, an important topic in economic development. 
9   See, for example, Posner (2002), chapter 3. Posner claims that economic efficiency requires 
property rights to be universal, alienable, and exclusive. A more general framework sees property 
rights as one of several alternative legal mechanisms (others include contract and tort law) by 




radio spectrum commons. However, a spectrum “commons” does not obviate the need for 
a central authority to determine the protocols and priorities that will govern how the 
commons is used. Similar government or regulatory involvement in the commons would 
be required under “net neutrality” proposals. In other words, a commons approach 
transfers from rights owners to regulators, rather than users, the responsibility for setting 
standards. It does not automatically preserve the values that the Lessig School seeks to 
protect. Also, to the extent that the assignment of access rights to platform providers is 
not efficient, it is necessary to consider other policy instruments (e.g., contract or tort 
solutions) before resorting to centralized regulation, for reasons we explore below. 
Both we and Lessig use property rights as an analytical tool, not as an ideological 
ensign. Economists want property rights to be put into the hands of their most efficient 
users, not necessarily to preserve them in the hands of existing owners. To do this, 
property rights should initially be designed efficiently so that the transactions to unbundle 
or re-bundle those rights are not unnecessarily restricted by transactions costs. Lessig’s 
analysis leads him to the view that assigning property rights over Internet access to 
platform owners would create “fences” within what should be a “commons,” inefficiently 
depriving users and producers of resources whose use would cost society nothing.  
The “net neutrality” debate is at heart a debate about the proper scope of property 
rights for resources used to produce IP communications services. Specifically, should 
owners of existing or future Internet hardware platforms be permitted to own the right to 
decide how to use the physical property in which they have invested, or should that right 
be assigned instead to users or to content providers? A utilitarian Coasian approach to 
this problem takes it as given that one important public policy objective is to improve 
economic well-being, and Lessig appears implicitly to accept this goal, among others. 
Those who, unlike Lessig, believe that access to the Internet is among the natural rights 
of humankind may find this paper useful mainly as a measure of what the costs and 
economic benefits of exercising that right might be. 
 
Analysis 
Overview of analysis 
A useful way to approach the economic analysis of a regulation or competition 




result from existing economic and technical conditions. The next step is to examine the 
economic incentives and opportunities of the economic actors to behave in ways that 
would lead to the bad outcome. The final step is to assess alternative policies (such as 
“net neutrality”) designed to avoid the bad outcome in terms of their likely effectiveness 
in eliminating the untoward incentives or opportunities, and their other benefits and costs. 
The “net neutrality” policy invites a focus on the provision of local residential 
broadband service. Proposals for net neutrality have generally centered on local providers 
of such services. Moreover, if the analysis shows that bad outcomes are unlikely for local 
residential access, then such outcomes are even less likely for business high-speed access 
or long haul Internet backbone provision, where there are more competitors. (Indeed, to 
the extent that residential users reach the Internet using commercial or institutional access 
modes (from work or school), this same competition would forestall the “bad outcomes” 
feared by those who assume that residential access itself will be highly concentrated.
10 
Whether any uniquely residential services will exist and remain immune from this source 
of competition cannot be predicted.) 
After examining the local residential broadband market, our analysis turns to look 
at rights of access and the demand for access regulation. With this background, we then 
assess the costs and benefits of prophylactic regulation and of waiting for some bad 
outcome before imposing remedial regulations. 
 
Background—Residential Broadband Services 
There are many varieties of “net neutrality,” a fact that may cause some problem 
in determining appropriate policy. For clarity we will focus on the idea that any provider 
of Internet connectivity (hardware, connections, etc., referred to as “platforms” here) has 
to make content (broadly defined) from any independent provider accessible to all users 
and, in particular, as easily accessible (both technically and economically) as content 
from integrated or affiliated providers. Further, in connection with the provision of such 
services, any provider of Internet connectivity has to use the current commonly accepted 
protocols for Internet services–in other words, must not adopt proprietary standards that 




proponents differentiate between an open access requirement that would operate at the 
transmission or facilities layer and a different set of rules that would operate at the 
“logical” layer. We interpret the logical layer version as a non-discrimination requirement 
in the standards dimension. The analysis below is applicable to either vision of net 
neutrality.  
Internet content and services are supplied by many thousands of commercial 
“sites” or providers, motivated by some combination of promotion goals (“click here to 
find out about our organization”), consumer payment (“click here to purchase”) or 
advertising revenue (banner and popup ads). In addition, numerous government and 
noncommercial sites offer free online information and services. The physical Internet is 
an concatenation of independently-owned networks, routers and servers that abide by 
certain voluntary interconnection standards. These networks pay each other to transmit or 
to route data among various nodes.  
Because there are so many suppliers of online information and service, and 
because users often have difficulty evaluating the quality and reliability of providers, 
there is an industry of intermediaries offering bundles of Internet services, including 
email, directories and search tools. There are various terms for this editing, bundling, or 
endorsement service, including “portal,” “aggregator,” and “Internet service provider” 
(ISP).
11 Examples of large editorial/aggregation services include America Online (AOL), 
MSN and Yahoo! Many ISPs operate local modem banks through which their retail 
customers obtain low-speed access to the Internet. The larger services offer proprietary 
content, email, and premium services. Some ISPs (e.g., AOL) also provide user software. 
All ISPs offer access to the wider Internet.  
The vast majority (over 73 percent according to eMarketer (2003)) of consumers 
who connect their home computers to the Internet still do so over ordinary telephone lines 
using analog modems. Virtually all residential analog Internet connections are provided 
                                                                                                                                                 
10   Media Metrix (2002) reports that more than half of high-speed online access for 18-50 year olds is 
through work or university. 
11   The terminology is confusing because there are no standard definitions. At one time an ISP was 
always in the business of providing physical access to the Internet via local modem banks that 
users reached by dialing a telephone number from their computer modem. Some but not all such 
ISPs were integrated into editorial or aggregation services. Today, the term ISP is often used to 




on facilities owned by local telephone companies (“incumbent local exchange carriers” or 
ILECs). However, digital “broadband” or “high speed” Internet connections are now a 
widely available alternative to analog modem connections. More than 83 percent of U.S. 
households live in zip codes where high speed Internet access service is available from 
one or more local providers and almost half live in zip codes with two or more 
providers.
12 Although digital connections are more expensive than analog connections, 
often costing two to four times as much, the higher speeds and other useful features of 
digital connections are sufficiently attractive that some home computer users (around 18 
percent of all households, or just over 27 percent of those with Internet connections) have 
switched to digital Internet connections.  
Table 1 
High Speed Internet Connections Serving U.S. End Users, December 31, 2002 
Provider 
Number 
(millions)  Percentage 
Telephone companies (ILECs) 7.1  35.9 
Cable companies  11.4  57.2 
Satellite, wireless and other (incl. CLEC)   1.4   6.9   
Total 19.9  100.0 
Note: Approximately 87 percent of High Speed lines serve residences and small 
businesses. Source and definitions: FCC (2003a). 
 
Broadband Internet connections from residences to Internet backbones are 
provided chiefly by ILECs and local cable operators. Cable offerings are often referred to 
as “cable modem” services. Telephone company offerings are often called “digital 
subscriber line” (DSL) services. High speed digital connections are also offered by other 
wireline providers, terrestrial wireless and satellite operators, but these alternatives do not 
yet have significant market shares. 
The federal government has granted various concessions to promote broadband 
deployment, including favorable regulatory and tax treatment, and subsidies for certain 
customers, such as schools. We take as given for present purposes that it is a policy goal 
of the federal government to expand the consumption of broadband services. This 
                                                 




supplements the usual economic policy goal of maximizing output for the benefit of 
consumers. 
As broadband service is now very widely available to American consumers, the 
focus of policy concern has shifted to the rate at which consumers are adopting the new 
services. While the rate of growth of new subscribers for these services has been very 
high, overall penetration remains at an early stage. (Table 1) 
Both cable operators and telephone companies provide broadband Internet access 
services on the same facilities used to provide other services—chiefly video 
entertainment and voice messaging, respectively. Cable operator video delivery was 
formerly subject to rate regulation, and basic video service still is, but today the cable 
industry faces competitive discipline from satellite providers of video entertainment 
services and other sources. 
There is not yet complete overlap in the areas where cable and DSL offer service, 
chiefly because DSL service currently is available to fewer households than have access 
to cable modem service.
13 This difference in coverage, which may diminish over time, 
helps to explain a large part of the current difference in the relative “market” shares of 
cable modem and DSL services. In the long run, of course, shares will depend on relative 
costs, the outcome of efforts to differentiate the products, and entry by competing 
technologies. 
 
Background—Rights of Access and Use 
Owners of physical transmission and transportation facilities (railroads, pipelines, 
gas and electricity suppliers, telephone companies, and other “utilities”) have long been 
subject to state and federal regulation that limits their control of access to the facilities 
they “own.” Indeed, rights of access to public utility property is but one point on a 
continuum. For example, owners of private property not commonly “imbued with a 
public interest” (such as the ordinary landlord, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, (1932)) 
may nevertheless face loss of control over access to or use of their property in certain 
exigencies. Even human capital and human life is subject to uncompensated taking by the 
                                                 
13   DSL service quality (transmission speed) deteriorates as the distance between the user and the 
central office increases. In contrast, cable modem service quality decreases as the number of users 




state in some circumstances, such as the military draft. Efforts by the courts to protect 
private property rights from uncompensated regulatory takings ended at a time when 
private property lost much of its political legitimacy, during the Great Depression. 
The earliest regulatory takings of private property in the public utility tradition 
were for the purpose of regulating prices, rather than access. Munn v. Illinois (1876), 
involved grain elevators, not usually considered to be utilities. But access and pricing go 
hand in hand. One cannot meaningfully transfer the right of access from a utility to users 
without also regulating the price of access, just as one cannot place a meaningful 
constraint on excessive prices without also transferring the right of access. The linkage 
arises for a couple of reasons. First, neither the services offered by utilities nor the costs 
of serving different users are uniform. This fact creates opportunities for discrimination, 
an escape route for the constrained utility. A utility that wishes to minimize access 
opportunities for a particular group can often define service to that user class, directly or 
indirectly, as a different service from that offered to others, and charge a higher price for 
it. Second, it is simply impossible to require access without mandating a price to be 
charged since the access supplier can deny access by setting a high enough price. 
More generally, it is useful to think about a right of access in terms of its relative 
value to different users. Any party that stands to gain substantially from controlling 
access to a facility will seek to own that right. If it can be purchased by outbidding others 
who value the right less highly, it will be. If the law forbids its purchase, the party will 
act to achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly. Attempts to stop this behavior require 
greater regulatory effort. The greater the regulatory effort, the more likely it is that 
behavior will be distorted with potential social costs. But—and this is a very important 
but—there is no basis to assume that a facility owner will be the party that places the 
highest value on control of access. 
Lots of facility owners seem to have no wish to control access, and no regulation 
of access is required. Lessig mentions electric utilities as an example of the “principle” of 
net neutrality, pointing out that electricity suppliers (along with water companies) do not 
discriminate among brands of electrical appliances (or faucets). True enough, but it is the 
preferences of electricity vendors that produces this result, not regulation. In fact, David 
and Bunn (1987) show that early competition among the different types of electricity 




electrical appliances. It would be unnecessary and potentially harmful
14 to establish a 
regulatory scheme guaranteeing a right of access for appliance brands to consumer 
electrical outlets. In this case, primum processi would be a bad policy.  
Indeed, a desire on the part of facility owners to control access or to integrate 
vertically is hardly universal. Where the desire to control access does not exist, no good 
can come, but harm may come, from its prohibition. Where it does exist, it may be 
motivated by benign incentives, by malign (e.g., anticompetitive) incentives, or by a 
combination of incentives. In these cases, maximization of consumer welfare requires 
investigation of the economic consequences of prohibitions on integration and property 
rights reassignments. 
Although not an original goal of uncompensated takings, economic efficiency (the 
maximization of economic welfare) has gradually gained supremacy as the accepted 
policy objective of utility regulation. This is the subject of a truly vast literature, both at a 
theoretical level and in specific industries. Even so, it is a subset of an even larger 
literature on the economics of regulation generally, including, for example, health, safety 
and environmental regulation. Adaptive behavior is a common theme in this literature. 
Economic agents respond to incentives. A constraint placed on an economic actor is 
never simply accepted. The actor, whether a firm or a person, seeks to adjust in ways that 
ease the burden of the constraint. Adaptations can take many and unexpected forms, from 
using inappropriate technologies of production to subversion of the political process.  
The outcome of adaptive behavior may very well be a reduction in economic 
welfare compared not simply to the ideal, but to the imperfect, unregulated status quo 
ante. Further interventions to remedy the consequences of adaptive behavior, while 
certainly possible in principle, often are extremely difficult to implement because of 
inadequate information.  
The important insight that arises from this literature on economic behavior under 
regulatory constraint, for present purposes, is that however serious a market imperfection 
may be, it cannot be assumed that a regulatory solution will produce a superior outcome. 
                                                 
14   Appliance manufacturers must design their products to meet certain standards in order to avail 
themselves of access. The establishment of those standards and changes in them raise important 
and difficult analytical and policy issues. There are conditions under which it would be valid to 
argue that vertical integration by electric utilities into the appliance business would provide a 




It may produce an outcome worse than the initial imperfection. Careful study may reveal 
which solution is better for consumers, and such study should occupy policy makers 
considering regulatory solutions. Further complicating the choice of solutions is the fact 
that regulatory intervention is accompanied by procedural rules and political realities that 
have a strong preference for the status quo. Imperfect markets often, though not always, 
are self-correcting. Thus, compared to imperfect market solutions, regulatory solutions 
are difficult to change, a point developed further below. 
Access to broadband cable service is not regulated today, and the FCC at present 
opposes such regulation. Telephone ILECs are subject both to rate regulation and to 
unbundling requirements that reflect the industry’s long regulatory and antitrust history 
as owners of monopoly “essential facilities,” and the federal government’s objective of 
promoting facilities-based entry in local telephone markets.  
ILEC DSL services are provided at higher frequencies on the same local copper 
wires simultaneously used to provide ordinary monopoly voice telephone service. For 
this reason, ILEC DSL services were subject to the same access requirements as other 
local telephone services until recently, but these requirements are to be phased out by 
2006. Under the new FCC rules, ILECs will still be required to provide unbundled loop 
access at regulated rates. ILECs will also be able to offer their own broadband content 
without any special safeguards, provided they provide access to the underlying facilities 
to other parties (FCC 2003b). 
 
The demand for access regulation 
The policy debate about access to local broadband services seems puzzling, at 
first glance, because LBB service today is not an entrenched monopoly. In many areas 
cable companies and telephone companies compete directly for customers, and other 
technologies, including wireless and satellite, may soon become important additional 
avenues of competitive supply. So why the fuss and why the hurry? The answer is 
primum processi, and the reason is largely based in interest group politics. 
Nobel Laureate George Stigler (1971) suggested many years ago that government 
regulation was a service for which there was a demand as well as a supply, and that not 
all the demand originates with consumers. As suggested by the word “subversion” above, 




policy mandarins in Washington. They are the outcomes of a political process in which 
interest groups play a very prominent role. Understanding the economic and other 
objectives of interest groups makes it easier to predict the outcome of the process. In this 
subsection we discuss the demand for access regulation by commercial and 
noncommercial interests. 
The commercial demand for access regulation arises from a fear on the part of 
some upstream suppliers of Internet content and services (as well as some consumer 
electronics manufacturers) that LBBs will themselves integrate vertically into various 
content, aggregation, or equipment businesses, and that this will be harmful to 
independent suppliers. This fear is articulated in terms of the possible anticompetitive 
effects of vertical integration, arising from a presumed desire on the part of LBBs to 
leverage local market power into upstream or downstream monopolization. The old Bell 
System illustrates the danger, although incentives created by regulation itself played an 
important role in AT&T’s desire to exclude competing suppliers or long distance services 
and telephone equipment. Noll and Owen (1994). Others point to the fear that some 
companies have of competing or potentially competing with Microsoft. 
An illustration of what commercial interests may fear is available today in the 
commercial relationship between Yahoo! (www.yahoo.com) and SBC Communication 
Inc. (www.sbc.com). SBC owns ILECs serving 12 states, including California, Illinois, 
Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin. It offers DSL service in large and growing portions of 
its service areas. Subscribers to SBC DSL receive not simply an Internet connection but a 
bundled subscription to Yahoo!, a rival of AOL, MSN and other ISPs. The bundled 
Yahoo! service does not prevent SBC subscribers from using any other Internet services, 
including Yahoo!’s most direct competitors. But unless the Yahoo! software is removed 
from a subscriber’s computer, Yahoo! remains the default portal through which all other 
Internet services pass. Whether or not this simple fact is sufficient to violate the principle 
of net neutrality, clearly SBC could do a variety things to make it more difficult for users 
to turn to rival sources of aggregated content and premium service. Ironically, Yahoo! 
has been among the leaders of the net neutrality movement, fearing, presumably, that its 
rivals will associate themselves with LBBs in a similar manner.  
The same commercial fear might also arise, however, from a belief on the part of 




attractiveness or lower cost to users, so that current suppliers would lose market share to 
more efficient integrated rivals. Thus, commercial advocacy of regulated access to LBB 
facilities is consistent both with a genuine fear of monopolization and with a desire to 
exclude or raise the costs of more efficient competitors. 
Only a few years ago, for example, open access was heavily promoted by 
America Online, which feared vertical integration into the aggregation business by cable 
operators offering LBB (cable modem) service in conjunction with @Home and Road 
Runner ISP services. At that time some argued that cable operators would monopolize 
LBB service. More recently, DSL market shares have increased, other technologies have 
begun to look more promising, @Home has failed despite vertical integration, and AOL 
withdrew as a supporter of forced access once it acquired its own extensive collection of 
cable systems.  
Today’s commercial net neutrality advocates include some software and content 
suppliers (for example, Amazon and Yahoo!) and consumer electronics manufacturers. 
The current motivation of this group may be the belief that LBB service, though not 
today a monopoly, eventually will be monopolized by whichever delivery technology 
turns out to be most efficient, or that the two major providers will each find it in its 
interest to exclude upstream service providers. To fend off that risk primum processi is 
urgent now, for these interests, before any damage is done, and before whatever dominant 
technology or technologies emerges has the political muscle to resist. Alternatively, these 
firms may simply fear increased competition from vertically integrated LBBs. 
There is no real basis to assume that LBB service will ultimately turn out to be 
monopolized. Whether this happens turns on the cost structures of various delivery 
technologies, of course, but also on the importance of product differentiation and the 
difference in costs in different areas. One plausible future structure for LBB service is 
competing facilities with differing characteristics. The differing characteristics might be 
transmission-specific qualities (speed or portability, for example), but might also involve 
integration with differing content and service packages. In that case, some form of 
exclusion could enhance the competitiveness of the marketplace. The exclusion might 




from a given LBB content aggregation of some independent content.
15 Territorial and 
product line exclusivity can be an important efficiency-enhancing feature of markets for 
the distribution of intellectual property. Mandating a right of access in these competitive 
circumstances would have the effect of constraining the market away from its most 
efficient structure, reducing consumer welfare by preventing suppliers from offering 
packages that consumers prefer.  
Put into property rights terms, assigning access rights to content suppliers rather 
than LBB operators would exclude the possibility of a range of potentially efficient 
outcomes; assigning access rights to operators would not. For example, a high-speed 
access provider might have the incentive to develop video instant messaging if it could 
guarantee speed and could reap the rewards from its investment in this complementary 
service. It is possible that mandating access to this technology for all high-speed access 
providers would make the investment in this complementary technology less attractive. If 
so, the service would never be offered. Coase’s second principle in this case requires the 
assignment of access rights to facilities owners. 
Similarly, if all bits are to be treated equally, it will not be possible to offer 
broadband content that requires priority in delivery, or guaranteed arrival times. For 
example, high quality real-time video conferencing requires that packets of bits not be 
delayed in their arrival. But, if the local provider is required to treat all bits equally, the 
bits that are going to the high school student downloading a pirated copy of the new 
Matrix movie will have the same priority. Given capacity constraints in the network, this 
could cause the video conference quality to be suboptimal, even though delay in 
delivering the movie to the student’s hard drive would be completely inconsequential 
because such one-way transmissions are easily buffered.  
The Lessig school counter-argument is that non-affiliated providers would spring 
forth to provide all sorts of innovative content and services if they had assurance that 
their upfront investment would not be expropriated by the access provider. However, the 
access provider should want to enhance the demand for its own transmission and content 
services. It cannot extract rents from services that do not exist. It does have an incentive 
to exclude or raise the costs of those providers that offer content that is a substitute for its 
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own, but only if the content is offered at the same or higher cost or if the content 
produces negative external effects on the overall demand for Internet content.
16 In this 
context, an LBB can certainly act opportunistically to raise a rival’s costs, but it cannot 
persist in such behavior without reducing the supply of content that it requires. The 
longer the life of the access provision and the more often the game with non-affiliated 
providers is repeated, the less incentive the access provider has to expropriate any 
individual provider’s investments.  
Commercial advocates of net neutrality therefore appear to want assurance that 
their own profit streams will not be put at either of two risks: the risk of anticompetitive 
discrimination by a hypothetical future LBB monopolist; and the risk of losing market 
share to a competitive group of LBB suppliers. The second risk is one that is inherent in 
the competitive process that benefits consumers.  Primum processi serves to protect 
against both threats. However, primum processi puts consumers at risk if the LBB market 
turns out to be (potentially) competitive. This could preclude an efficient, competitive 
outcome in advance of knowing whether a monopoly outcome is likely, much less 
whether imperfect regulation will improve consumer welfare relative to imperfect 
competition.  
The noncommercial (academic and self-styled consumer advocate) demand for 
access regulation arises in part from admiration for the astonishing speed with which the 
Internet has changed many important aspects of life and work, and the attribution of these 
benefits to the original openness, transparency, volunteerism, and libertarian spirit of the 
Internet technical community. The Internet’s early “openness,” of course, was an 
unintended side effect of the military objectives (preservation of communication during 
nuclear attack) of the Internet’s original Department of Defense sponsors.  
Some noncommercial net neutrality advocates have adopted the term “end-to-
end” to describe the architecture of the Internet because it allows any intelligent device to 
be attached and to communicate using the agreed-upon protocols. This architecture is 
chiefly responsible, they argue, for the many different ideas and services that have 
blossomed on the Internet because no one can block any content or service that uses the 
agreed-upon protocols. (Unfortunately this includes spam.) But this openness inevitably 
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has a price: there have doubtless been useful services (such as effective spam filters!) that 
have been slowed or even blocked because of the requirement that the network not have 
embedded intelligence. While “end-to-end” architecture has benefits, those benefits 
standing alone do not prove that the architecture was or will continue to be optimal. The 
benefits must be put onto the scales with the costs, most of which may involve the loss of 
services that never came into existence, as the relative prices and functionality of 
processors, storage, and communication links have evolved. It is noteworthy that the 
degree to which “intelligence” is centralized rather than located at user terminals has 
changed repeatedly during the half-century history of computing.
17  
The very fact that the Internet and all the new services associated with it was an 
unintended and unpredicted side effect of military planning for thermonuclear war serves 
as a vivid illustration of the power of unintended effects. The last generation of academic 
writers on regulation of industry, from airlines to telephones, documented the unintended 
and unpredicted consequences of regulations designed to protect consumers, but which 
had the opposite effect (Noll and Owen (1983)). Virtually everyone, including the 
experts, was surprised to find, for example, that “hubbing” was an efficient way to run an 
airline, a practice that was impossible before deregulation of the airline industry in 1976. 
Similarly, it is impossible to predict the type and importance of unintended effects of 
regulation seeking to impose net neutrality.  
For example, the end-to-end “spirit” of the Internet was responsible, in the early 
1990s, for a failed effort to prevent privatization and commercialization of the Internet. 
Internet users, at that time chiefly academics, believed that permitting commercial use of 
the Internet would be socially harmful. Had this effort succeeded, none of the commercial 
services associated with the Internet today, including Yahoo!, eBay and Amazon, would 
have come into existence. This consequence of privatization (or of failing to privatize) 
was not predictable.  
Put into property rights terms, the early post-military Internet is remembered as an 
idyllic commons, in which no one asserted property rights and all nevertheless 
cooperated unselfishly to advance the technology and its uses. But such a utopia, if it ever 
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existed, could not last. As demonstrated by the failed hippie communes of the 1960s and 
the failed experiment of Vladimir Lenin, we ignore supply side incentives at our peril. 
The perceived success of the pre-privatization period, along with the apparent 
continued success of certain open source software, is taken as evidence that commercial 
property rights—i.e., the right to exclude—are not compatible with sustained 
technological progress in this field. From this perspective, the possibility of LBB 
monopolization is a sufficient basis for regulation, but by no means a necessary 
condition. In fact, any market structure that involves an element of exclusivity would be 
offensive.  
But even if an idyllic commons protected by end-to-end architecture had been 
among the reasons for the growth of the Internet, it does not provide a sufficient basis for 
preserving by force of law the historical Internet architecture. Indeed, it seems ironic that 
the interest group most nostalgic for the heady freedom that Defense Department 
planners inadvertently provided to the computer scientists of the 1980s is intent on 
preventing the benefits that might arise from similar architectural freedom for future 
innovators.  
 
Public Goods and Network Effects 
Professor Lessig’s own analysis is much more pointed than our characterization 
of his “school.” Lessig sees the Internet as an instance in which private property rights 
would limit the potential benefits of the technology by ruling out gains that cost nothing 
to produce. Lessig’s description of the phenomenon he seeks to promote by protecting the 
Internet commons from enclosure is not given in economic terms. However, it appears to 
correspond to two concepts that economists call, respectively, “public goods” and 
“network externalities.” These are distinct concepts, although both have implications for 
the assignment of property rights. 
A pure public good is one that costs nothing to provide to any user after the first, 
and is non-rivalrous in consumption. Intellectual property usually fits this definition quite 
closely. Other common examples are TV broadcasts and national defense. Most goods 
have an element of public-ness in this sense, which also can be thought of in terms of the 
distinction between fixed and variable cost. The Internet, or some aspects of it, has the 




public-ness arises, but Lessig appears to argue that it lies in the Internet’s design 
standards and philosophy (end-to-endedness, or lack of central direction). For present 
purposes we will take this at face value, but it is perhaps worth further scrutiny. 
Network externalities occur when the value of a good or service to a particular 
user increases as the number of other users increases. The fax machine is a common 
example. A fax machine is a lot more useful if there are lots of people with fax machines 
rather than few. Fax machines were available for purchase for decades before they 
suddenly became popular and common in the 1980s. Demand accelerated as the number 
of owners grew.  
Lessig uses network externalities and public goods, without naming them, to 
argue that no one should be allowed to restrict access to the Internet (i.e., that rights of 
access should not be assigned at all, or equivalently, assigned to all actual and potential 
users). In the case of public goods, it is inefficient to exclude any particular user, because 
it costs nothing to supply service (or at least certain aspects of service) to any particular 
user. If property rights are assigned to facility owners, they will seek to exclude those 
who do not pay, reducing social welfare. In the case of network externalities, the 
exclusion of any particular user reduces the value of the Internet to all other users. Hence, 
it is inefficient to exclude any particular user by charging a price above marginal cost that 
has such an effect. Lessig is perfectly correct on these points. Unfortunately, however, his 
analysis focuses solely on the demand side of the Internet world, neglecting the supply 
side. 
The difficulty is that if we assign property rights in access to users rather than 
suppliers, resulting in an efficient price of access (zero), there will be no long run supply 
of Internet services. A zero price yields zero revenues—a lesson many dotcoms learned 
too late. While the benefits of the Internet can be made available to any particular user at 
zero cost, they cannot be made available to all users at zero cost. This phenomenon is 
well known in economics—while marginal cost pricing is efficient, a firm has to have the 
expectation that it will be able to cover all of its cost including a reasonable profit in 
order to provide service. Ramsey (1927) developed the first model to show that price 
discrimination would achieve optimal departures from marginal cost pricing so that the 
firm could cover total costs and therefore have an incentive to produce. In the case of 




zero is not always the best practical price. Lessig would probably agree that price of 
access would have to be above zero. But then how far above zero should the price be and 
how should the level be determined? These questions are unanswered by any of the net 
neutrality or open access proponents, perhaps because the only answer is regulation. 
If providing Internet service is costly and there are no revenues, or revenues are 
less than costs, obviously there will be no Internet. Having no Internet is worse than 
having an inefficiently small or exclusive Internet. The problem is not so stark as this, 
however. If suppliers can discriminate among users, they can charge high prices to those 
with high use values and low prices to others, in principle ending up with plenty of 
supply and no or little inefficient exclusion. Similar results can be obtained, in some 
cases, by bundling public goods with private goods. For example, intellectual property is 
imbedded in private-good media such as CDs, books, and periodicals. Also, in the case of 
network externalities, each user does not have equal value to other users as a potential 
communicant, and welfare losses can be reduced by pricing accordingly.  
The commons approach similarly ignores supply-side problems that arise because 
the demand for transmission is dependent on the supply of content, and vice versa, and 
because one kind of content may increase or decrease the demand for other content, or for 
transmission. These effects can often be taken into account by pricing, but sometimes 
require internalization by a single supplier. Net neutrality would ban both of these 
solutions. 
We see Lessig’s demand for a ban on property rights (of access) in an Internet 
commons as an over-reaction to a common problem in the supply of goods and services. 
The potential loss of “costless gains” that might arise from assigning property rights to 
facility owners is very likely to be more than offset by gains from increased supply of 
Internet services. There are reasons for suppliers themselves to minimize exclusion of 
low-value users, where this is feasible.  
 
Regulatory Model for Broadband Access   
Although LBB service is not today a classic monopoly, and even though there is 
no evidence that it will become one, and despite the fact that not all monopolists seek to 




regulation would take if a policy of net neutrality were adopted. Only in this way can the 
potential benefits and costs of such regulation be assessed. 
In the case of rights of access to LBB platforms that do not yet exist, there is a 
policy tradeoff between the incentive to produce LBB transmission services and the 
incentive to engage in the creation of content and other upstream services. Both inputs 
are required to produce delivered Internet services for consumers. The right should be 
assigned, in the presence of significant transaction costs, and holding other things equal, 
to whichever set of holders has the greatest demand for the right.
18 There are several 
problems, however, in assigning the access right to upstream content suppliers.  
The first problem is that there are no significant transaction costs involved in 
LBBs selling access to content suppliers, whereas the reverse is not true. An LBB 
operator cannot purchase access rights from a set of sellers whose identities are unknown. 
Most would not come forward or even exist until a general offer of purchase were made. 
Many sellers would be fraudulent. Second, as noted above, some upstream suppliers may 
produce negative externalities on demand for overall delivered content, which they have 
no incentive to take into account. Well-known examples include spam, pornography, and 
other material whose very presence reduces consumer demand for connections. LBBs 
have a greater incentive than individual independent content suppliers to internalize this 
externality. The reverse problem exists for content producers that may generate positive 
externalities in demand. 
In the case of reassigning access rights to existing facilities ex post, from LBBs to 
content providers, there is an additional consideration, which is the adverse effect on 
investment incentives of an uncompensated taking. Subtracting without compensation 
one of the property rights that an investor created (or would create) through a risky 
investment of funds with an opportunity cost clearly will reduce, perhaps to zero, the 
amount it is rational to invest. The result, inevitably, is a reduction in the supply of new 
or upgraded LBB facilities.  
While a right of access newly reassigned to content providers might take any 
number of forms as discussed above, the analysis below assumes that the Commission 
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would apply essentially the same access regulations that are currently (prior to phase-out) 
imposed on the digital subscriber line (DSL) services of local telephone companies. We 
refer to this as the “DSL regulatory model.” The current regulations require telephone 
companies (ILECs) to offer “unbundled elements” of their local networks, including 
bandwidth capacity on local telephone wires (“loops”), to resellers at wholesale prices 
reflecting “forward looking incremental cost.” We assume that analogous regulations 
would be fashioned for other LBBs in the event the Commission opted to force access to 
all broadband systems, whether at the physical or logical level of the network. 
The assumption that forced access to LBB services, if it occurred, would resemble 
current DSL regulation is not arbitrary. As with DSL, a mere access requirement for 
cable systems is likely to be meaningless in the absence of unbundling and maximum 
wholesale price regulation. This will become obvious once the Commission comes face 
to face with the need to adjudicate access complaints. If ISP access to LBB platforms is 
desirable from a consumer welfare perspective and yet would not otherwise be available, 
we argue below that it must be because LBB systems have very substantial market power 
in the relevant market, that alternatives are not available, that LBB operators refuse to 
grant access, and that access would force LBB operators to lower retail prices. In those 
circumstances any regulation less intrusive than current DSL-type regulation would be 
unlikely, even if the Commission began with a simple access requirement, because 
increasingly intrusive and detailed regulation would flow inevitably from the need to 
resolve access disputes, just as it did in telephony in the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
 
Essential facilities policy  
In assessing market power, its consequences and remedies, it is useful to consider 
the experience of competition policy enforcement, which has long confronted nearly 
identical issues in a variety of industrial contexts. The essential facilities doctrine, which 
arises in the common law of antitrust, is relevant because it deals with the circumstances 
in which forced access is a useful remedy for a situation where the vertically-integrated 
owner of a bottleneck facility uses its monopoly of that facility to exclude equally or 
more efficient competitors from an upstream or downstream market in which the 




The classic example is the practice of local telephone companies, when they were owned 
by AT&T, of excluding AT&T’s long distance competitors from access to local 
connections.) The interesting question, then, becomes whether the underlying problem 
for which the net neutrality remedy is proposed meets the standards that courts and 
commentators have set, at a general level, as justifying such a remedy on the basis of 
costs and benefits to consumers.  
Forced access is regarded as an extraordinary remedy in monopoly cases because 
it requires on-going supervision of technical production decisions and regulation of 
prices, because it risks raising production costs and hence retail prices, and because it 
may have adverse spillover effects on the investment decisions of parties and nonparties 
alike. As Justice Breyer observes, 
“Even the simplest kind of compelled sharing, say, requiring a railroad to share 
bridges, tunnels, or track, means that someone must oversee the terms and conditions of 
that sharing. Moreover, a sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s 
incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of 
value-creating investment, research, or labor.” (Justice Breyer, dissenting in AT&T Corp. 
v. Iowa Utilities Bd. (1999)). 
A market power problem justifying such a drastic remedy as forced access must 
be truly a bottleneck—an entrenched, long term, otherwise intractable monopoly, and 
accompanied by ample evidence of adverse effects on consumer welfare. Further, the 
situation must be one in which access can have a positive effect on consumer welfare, 
such as facilitating a transition to facilities-based competition or facilitating competition 
in products or services of which the monopolized component is a relatively small part. 
The standard for market power in essential facilities cases accordingly is the highest one 
that exists in competition policy. 
Do LBB operators have “bottleneck” market power in providing local broadband 
service? If so, is there evidence that the market power is used to exclude more efficient 
competitors or to raise consumer prices in either upstream or downstream markets? These 
questions must be answered affirmatively if forced access is to make economic sense in a 
competition policy context.  
First, LBB operators today by definition do not possess a “bottleneck” monopoly 




foreclosure could take place, or identified either a systematic refusal of access or an 
economic incentive to refuse access.  
Given current competition in providing broadband Internet access services, the 
question of forced access does not even get to first base in an analysis of potential costs 
and benefits under essential facilities doctrine because there is no essential facility. 
Specifically, Internet content providers, aggregators, and ISPs have alternative ways to 
reach consumers, and consumers have alternatives to DSL or cable modems. These 
alternatives will likely increase. LBB operators could not and do not inefficiently exclude 
competitors in upstream or downstream markets. 
In fact, if one believes that there is a chance for additional competition to come in 
the form of widespread wireless or satellite facilities, it may be crucial to permit vertical 
integration in order not to reduce the investment incentives of these entrants. Otherwise, 
cable, DSL, and business access may remain the only competitors in the LBB 
marketplace. A regulatory model that detracts from the potential returns for new entrants 
diminishes the incentives to provide the hoped for competition, and may become a self-
fulfilling prophecy of eventual monopoly. 
If there is no economic policy case for forced access requirements today, might 
such regulations be a prudent precaution against future problems? Any new industry as it 
matures may begin to display increased concentration, heightened entry barriers and a 
slowing of technological change. Schumpeter (1942) saw this process of competition to 
become the surviving supplier in a mature market as the central dynamic engine of 
economic growth. In that case, incumbent firms may gain market power or even 
monopolies. But such an outcome is by no means inevitable, and prophylactic application 
of access regulation would penalize—and therefore discourage—efforts to achieve early 
success in young and dynamic industries. The recent dotcom crash provides a florid 
example of Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction at work, and the surviving 
content providers—the Amazons and the eBays—are stronger companies as a result. 
So far as we are aware, no LBB operator has ventured into the non-local-
transmission aspects of ISP service except as a means to jump start subscriber demand for 
their transmission services. (We assume that is the correct characterization of the 
SBC/Yahoo relationship.) The fact is that the earliest efforts to offer content and 




independent ISPs, but by firms owned by cable operators. These efforts took place in the 
face of the failure of independent suppliers of such services to come forward, and 
certainly have not resulted in any market power or dominance, as witnessed by the 
bankruptcy of @Home, once the leading cable-owned ISP. In other words, cable 
operators’ so-far-not-very-successful efforts to offer upstream services tailored to the 
special features of broadband are better understood as attempts to remedy the failure of 
independent ISPs and content providers to provide such service than as an attempt to 
monopolize or foreclose any market. 
The benefit (if any) of regulation of LBB service is the potential consumer 
welfare gains from reducing the distortions caused by monopoly power. Our conclusion 
from the preceding analysis is that there is no case for DSL-type regulation (i.e., essential 
facility regulation) of local broadband services. The adoption of such regulation would 
not be in the public interest because there is no conceptual or empirical evidence of any 
monopoly power or any distortion. None of the necessary conditions for essential facility 
treatment of LBB is currently met, implying that the weight of experience from more 
than a century of weighing costs and benefits of forced access militates strongly against 
such intervention.  
Whether the necessary conditions for essential facility regulation will exist in the 
future is an entirely speculative question. Some have argued that imposition of 
restrictions now is important because there is a chance that restrictions will be required in 
the future. Their argument continues that it would be better to put on restrictions now 
because it will be more difficult if not impossible to implement regulations in the future 
(citing, for example, the difficulty of designing meaningful remedies in the Microsoft 
case) against an entrenched monopolist. Such fears would need to come up with a high 
probability of the need for restrictions in the future, a low cost of restrictions now, and a 
high probability that absent current restrictions, future restrictions would be difficult to 
enact. In short, the monopolist would need to be identified and a remedy imposed in 
advance. None of those arguments appear to have been made, much less supported. 
As a result, there is no case for the imposition of regulation because of current 
anticompetitive activity or essential facilities; and there is also no case for current 
imposition because of a high likelihood of future competitive problems. 




Summary and Conclusion 
We have considered and rejected the notion that special features of the historical 
architecture of the Internet must be preserved by law in order to prevent an unraveling of 
the benefits of the Internet. We have also considered and rejected the more conventional 
case for local broadband access being classified as an essential facility in the antitrust 
tradition, and local broadband access clearly, for the same reasons, is not a natural 
monopoly justifying the application of public utility principles. Where does this leave us 
in terms of the choice between primum non nocere and primum processi? Should we Act 
Now to forestall the threat of exclusion, or should we be careful, First, to Do No Harm? 
Lemley and Lessig (2000) and Bar et al (2000) set out the arguments that lead 
them to conclude that waiting will be problematic for the future of the Internet. 
Essentially, they argue that thirty years of FCC regulation has kept the network owners 
(the ILECs that supply local analog, or low-speed, Internet access) out of the Internet. 
The Internet has flourished during this time, they argue, precisely because innovative 
firms have had unfettered access to the network and users without the ILECs being able 
to influence network design. But dial-up analog connections to the Internet are identical 
to—indeed, are—voice connections; telephone companies have always controlled the 
technical standards, such as bandwidth, pertaining to these connections. Thus, indirectly, 
the necessity to rely on analog connections has until the recent advent of high-speed 
services very much affected the architecture of the Internet. Further, no FCC regulation 
has prevented the ILECs from offering Internet services, or Internet-like services, other 
than a requirement that such services be offered through a separate subsidiary. Present 
FCC regulations, to be phased out, provide for non-discriminatory access to telephone 
company high-speed platforms, but do not prevent the telephone companies from 
determining the technological characteristics of the services offered. 
Their argument is also based in part on the prediction that cable is the technology 
that is likely to dominate the next generation of Internet access and on the assumption 
that each local area will be served by a single local cable system. So consumers will have 
one main choice and the local cable companies will become not only the dominant 
supplier of high-speed Internet access, but also seek to extend their control of the network 
and influence network design to maximize their own profits. As we point out above, there 




LBB service, or that if one does, it will be profitable for that monopolist to exclude 
equally or more efficient upstream or downstream suppliers. 
Even competition among LBB services, they contend, will not be sufficient to 
squelch the danger of vertical foreclosure of access. Bar et al. argue that even under the 
current FCC rules applicable to DSL, the closed cable system will reduce competition to 
“host” independent ISPs so that the ILEC will be less hospitable to its third party ISPs. In 
addition, they argue that a duopoly is not sufficient to provide the openness that allowed 
the Internet to flourish. For example, competition in wireless telephony surely increased 
with the introduction of additional PCS licensees to compete with the cellular duopolies. 
But that does not mean that an unregulated duopoly (or even monopoly) would produce 
worse results than a vertically regulated firm or set of firms. Nor does it mean that such a 
policy is the appropriate policy to provide incentives for competing access providers. Of 
course, a policy of primum processi shifts the burden on these points to advocates of 
deregulation, who must prove a negative: that the absence of regulation would not lead to 
harm. 
The “bad outcome” in the Lessig school scenario is that failing to restrict the 
ability of LBB operators to deny access will lead to exclusion of efficient suppliers. The 
claim is that this exclusion is not only harmful to current consumers because they are 
denied the choice that a competitive market would give them, but more importantly that 
such control would artificially dictate the path of investment and innovation for the future 
of the Internet. In other words, the risk is that a closed solution would lead to a path that 
is optimized for the cable and DSL provider and not necessarily optimized for long-term 
consumer welfare. 
For the reasons already given, we think this story falls far short of justifying the 
equivalent of “preventative detention” for current and coming LBB access platforms. The 
story does not account of the costs we have enumerated above, and appears to be based 
very largely on the assumption that the historical path of the Internet was optimal and that 
the history of the Internet is also its future. This assumption may be user-friendly, but it is 
unsupported by evidence.  
Access regulation involves an assessment of the risk of two kinds of error. The 
first, the focus of the Lessig School, is that worthy new services and innovations will be 




The second, which the Lessig School ignores, is that a vertically integrated monopolist 
will have incentives to produce more output than a vertically disintegrated industry 
would, and that (a) centrally controlled network(s) would, in the future, become more 
efficient than (an) “end-to-end” network(s). The preceding parentheses remind us that of 
the possibility that competing, differentiated networks will be the most efficient outcome. 
Some public policy choices are close calls, because the costs and benefits of the 
alternative courses are equal. The net neutrality proposal is not one of these hard choices 
at this point in time. There is no evidence that the outcome proponents of net neutrality 
wish to avoid (hardware platform owners’ controlling access and choosing content) is 
likely to happen, or that if it did happen it would be harmful to consumers. Rather than 
holding back the North Sea, the dike into which net neutrals would insert their fingers is 
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